StatCounter

Wednesday, November 18, 2026

Larry C. Johnson, "Plenty of Crude, Nothing to Put in the Plane"

Ruwais Refinery
"Plenty of Crude, Nothing to Put in the Plane"
by Larry C. Johnson

"Washington has a favorite energy statistic, and it’s the price of Brent. When crude dips, the briefers relax, the cable anchors declare the crisis contained, and somebody in the West Wing takes credit. Nobody fills an airliner with Brent, though. You can’t run a truck on it, and a bulldozer won’t start on it either. Crude is the raw material. What the world actually burns comes out of refineries, and the refineries that matter most to this war are sitting within easy drone range of Iran.

Karl W. Miller has sent me his latest forward-looking assessment, dated November 18, and it makes that point with his usual precision. If the shooting between the United States and Iran starts up again, Karl expects Gulf refining and fuel supply to be among the first things to get hurt. And he warns that cheap crude will be cold comfort if you can’t get your hands on jet fuel and diesel.

What Karl is forecasting: Karl’s argument is simple, and the logic is hard to argue with. In a new round of direct fighting, Iran has every incentive to make the war expensive for people who aren’t on the battlefield. The neighbors who host, supply or refuel American forces are the obvious candidates. Karl expects Tehran to consider pressure, through threats or actual attacks, on the energy sectors of the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, especially wherever it sees a link between a Gulf refinery and US military fuel supply. He adds that any public connection between commercial fuel suppliers and military supply chains could make that pressure worse.

His key insight is that the damage spreads even when the missiles miss. Facilities shut down as a precaution. Ships stop moving. Insurers pull cover. Traders walk away. As Karl puts it, a refinery doesn’t have to be destroyed for buyers to lose their scheduled deliveries. Karl is careful, as always, to call this a proprietary forecast and not a report that Iran has decided to do anything. I’ll respect that line. I’ll also note that, given the year we’ve had, the forecast doesn’t require much imagination.

Al Ruwais: the bullseye with a refinery attached: Karl puts Al Ruwais at the center of the UAE’s exposure, and that’s no exaggeration. ADNOC says the complex can process more than 922,000 barrels of crude and condensate a day, which makes it the fourth-largest single-site refinery in the world. Before the war it shipped roughly 600,000 barrels a day of diesel, jet fuel, naphtha and other products. And this isn’t hypothetical. An Iranian drone already hit Ruwais earlier this year. According to OilPrice.com, which relies on ADNOC and Bloomberg, the refinery has since been restored to full operating capacity. Forgive me if I don’t break out the champagne.

First, consider the source. ADNOC is a state oil company in a country that markets itself as the safe harbor of the Gulf, and it’s selling diesel into the tightest market in decades. It has every commercial and political reason to tell buyers the plant is humming. Nobody outside ADNOC has independently verified the claim, at least not publicly. Second, the numbers don’t line up. The same report says product exports have recovered to only about 70 percent of pre-war levels. If the refinery is truly running flat out, where is the other 30 percent going? Either the plant isn’t producing what ADNOC says, or the fuel is being made and can’t get out of the Gulf. Neither explanation is reassuring, and the second one leads directly to the problem nobody in Washington wants to talk about: ships.

Karl’s second point is the one the planners in Washington should tape to their monitors. If Ruwais goes down at the same time as Saudi or Qatari refining, there’s nowhere nearby to make up the difference. Everyone in the neighborhood loses capacity together. He also makes a distinction I appreciate: Qatar’s refined products and condensate processing need to be assessed separately from its LNG. Trouble in one does not automatically mean an outage in the other, and lazy analysis that lumps them together will get both wrong.

No ships, no fuel: Here’s the part of the equation the optimists keep leaving out. A barrel of crude or a tonne of diesel is worth nothing in the Gulf. It has to be put on a tanker and sailed out, and since the war began the hard part has been finding a ship whose owner is willing to come and get it.

The analysts at Kpler put it bluntly. The market isn’t short of tankers in general. It’s short of tankers willing and able to work in the Gulf, where war risk has rewritten freight pricing. At the October peak, Middle East–to–China supertanker rates hit $37 a barrel, with earnings around $1.4 million a day. Think about that. The freight alone cost more than a third of what the crude itself was worth.

Refined products have it worse. Product tankers are smaller and earn less per voyage, so the war-risk insurance hits them harder. Back in June, the broker BRS reported that additional war-risk premiums for clean tankers ran around 7 to 9 percent of hull value, against about 5 percent for crude carriers, and that smaller product tankers were being scared away from Hormuz altogether. By mid-October, the International Energy Agency reported that LR1 product tankers from the Gulf to Japan cost nearly $27 a barrel, five times the pre-war rate.

The optimists will point out that supertanker rates have dropped by about two-thirds since early October as Gulf exports recovered and the risk premium eased. True, and that’s exactly my point. Freight rates are a thermometer for fear. They came down because the shooting slowed. Restart the war that Karl is describing and the owners, the insurers and the crews will make the same calculation they made when the war began in February. Ruwais could be running at 110 percent and it wouldn’t matter. If no one will send a tanker to Ruwais, the jet fuel stays in the tank farm.

Why cheap crude won’t save you: This is where Karl’s assessment collides with the Washington victory lap. The question for buyers, he writes, is not how much oil is in the ground or even how much crude is on the water. It’s how much on-spec jet fuel and diesel actually reaches the customer on time. Extra crude doesn’t turn into jet fuel by wishing. It needs refining capacity that’s available, inventories you can draw on, cargoes and ships. Take out the refineries and the extra crude just sits there, cheap and useless. In a severe disruption, Karl expects delivered fuel prices to rise much faster than the crude benchmarks.

The market is already proving him right, and we haven’t even had the renewed war yet. Earlier this month, Brent fell 8.7 percent, while the diesel crack spread, the premium for turning crude into diesel, stood at $87.40 a barrel. S&P Global’s November outlook calls diesel markets “very tight” because Middle Eastern exports have dropped so sharply, and it reports that global jet fuel stocks kept shrinking in October as demand outran supply. So when the next official tells you oil prices are coming down, ask him what a gallon of diesel costs. Then watch him change the subject.

The money follows the fuel: Karl then follows the damage from the refinery gate into the balance sheet. A sustained interruption raises costs for airlines, freight companies, builders and manufacturers. Longer delivery times force everyone to carry bigger inventories, and bigger inventories eat working capital. Traders face higher collateral demands and tighter credit. Payments get delayed. And the lawyers get rich arguing over force majeure, who gets allocated what, and whose contract was actually performed.

The Gulf states have spent decades selling themselves as the safe, reliable hub where you can fly in, do business and fly out. Karl warns that aviation disruption and higher operating costs could undercut confidence in the region’s logistics, tourism and investment climate. Dubai’s brand is built on the idea that the planes always leave on time. Planes need jet fuel.

Karl is careful to say these effects depend on how long an interruption lasts and how far it spreads, and that they should be modeled as conditional outcomes, not fixed losses. His advice for anyone with exposure: stress-test your energy portfolio for several suppliers going down at once, along with shipping delays and rising margin calls. Confirm that you have usable inventory, alternative suppliers and delivery rights before the shooting starts, not after. And check whether your suppliers, insurers, banks and shippers all share the same geographic risk. They probably do.

The bottom line: Karl’s central forecast is an elevated risk of early disruption to Gulf refining and fuel supply in any renewed direct conflict with Iran, with Al Ruwais and the Saudi and Qatari downstream systems at the top of the list. His closing line is the one I’d send to every official who has ever pointed at a falling Brent chart and called it good news: lower crude prices offer little reassurance if the physical products, the ships or the money to buy them run short.

If Washington decides to have another go at Iran, the war won’t be measured in how much crude the Saudis can pump. It’ll be measured in whether a cargo jet in Frankfurt can fuel up, whether a truck in Ohio can afford to roll, and whether a refinery on the Abu Dhabi coast is still standing, and whether anyone will send a ship to collect what it makes. Iran has already shown it can reach Ruwais. Karl is simply pointing out that it can do it again, and that the bill will land far from the Gulf."

No comments:

Post a Comment