"Saudi Arabia at the Breaking Point"
by Larry C. Johnson
"For most of this war, Saudi Arabia has been the shock absorber of the world oil market. When Hormuz closed, Riyadh pushed crude west through the East-West pipeline to Yanbu on the Red Sea and kept at least part of its exports moving. That bypass is now under attack. Ansar Allah has seized islands at the mouth of the Red Sea, declared a “maritime ban” on Saudi shipping and claimed strikes on Saudi airports, and in September drones knocked the East-West pipeline largely out of service. Riyadh blamed that strike on Iranian-backed militias in Iraq. On October 4 a pumping station at Khurais, east of Riyadh, was hit for the first time and the pipeline stopped again.
Karl Miller, whose earlier assessment of the global fuel emergency I have drawn on before, has just completed a new analysis of what this means for Saudi Arabia and for the world. His conclusion is stark: the Gulf’s energy system will take far longer and cost far more to rebuild than anyone in Washington is admitting, and Saudi Arabia can no longer be counted on to cover the gap. Here are his key findings.
1. The bypass is the weak point: Miller’s starting point is that a pipeline is not a pipe. It is a connected system of pumping stations, power supplies, controls, storage tanks and loading berths, and it is only as strong as its weakest link. The September damage to the East-West pumping stations, the October interruption at Khurais, a fire at the Riyadh energy complex and the disruption of Saudi aviation all hit that system at different points. The pipeline has been partly restored, but Miller warns that permanent equipment losses remain unresolved. Yanbu can be shut down without a single bomb hitting the port: if crude stops arriving, tankers stop loading.
He also cautions against counting damaged stations as if each represented a fixed share of lost capacity. What matters is throughput, and he measures it against a benchmark of 5.8 million barrels a day through the corridor. A complete interruption for seven days would put 40.6 million barrels of movement at risk; for 30 days, 174 million. He stresses that this is a stress calculation, not a claim that the line is fully shut.
2. The rebuild now runs to 2033–2036: In his previous paper Miller set a five-year horizon for rebuilding the damaged Gulf energy complex. He has now extended it to seven to ten years for the most severely damaged, interconnected systems, meaning recovery between roughly October 2033 and October 2036. Partial output will return sooner, but full, reliable operation will not.
The reason is equipment. Large compressors, turbines, high-voltage transformers, specialized pressure vessels and integrated control systems are custom-built and cannot be pulled from a warehouse. His critical path for replacing such a package is 84 months: a year to define the damage and fund the design, three years to procure and manufacture, two years to deliver and install, and a year to commission and stabilize. Insecure sites, financing gaps, factory queues and repeated attacks could add up to three more years. As he puts it, money can reserve a manufacturing slot, but it cannot compress every stage of engineering and fabrication.
3. A bill of $550 billion to $2.28 trillion: Miller models the reconstruction of the wider Gulf energy system, Saudi Arabia included, in three scenarios. He is explicit that these are funding envelopes built on stated assumptions, not audited damage estimates and not a Saudi-only bill. Source: Karl W. Miller, "Saudi Arabia: The Breaking Point" (12 October 2026). Covers the broader Gulf reconstruction portfolio.
In the central case, $180 billion must be committed in the first two years alone, rising to $540 billion in years three to five. Over seven years that averages more than $170 billion a year. And every Gulf state will be competing for the same manufacturers, engineering firms, fabrication yards and specialist crews. A transformer slot taken by Kuwait or Qatar is one that Saudi Arabia does not get.
4. Delay is expensive: Miller puts numbers on what waiting costs. A three-year delay on the central program could add $76 billion to $125 billion in cost escalation and another $42 billion to $90 billion in financing charges. Meanwhile the fuel must still be bought somewhere: each year that 1 million barrels a day of fuel supply stays offline means 365 million barrels to replace, about $55 billion at his illustrative price of $150 a barrel. Leaving his full 3 million barrel-a-day gap unrepaired for three more years implies nearly $500 billion in replacement purchases.
5. The diesel gap gets wider: Miller’s baseline remains a minimum global shortfall of 3 million barrels a day of diesel and jet fuel. The Saudi attacks threaten to push it higher. If disruption leaves 1 million barrels a day of crude unable to reach working refineries, the loss of diesel and jet fuel is roughly 300,000 to 450,000 barrels a day. An additional net loss of 500,000 barrels a day would raise his baseline to 3.5 million, an increase of one-sixth, adding 15 million barrels of shortfall every month.
He is careful not to double count: lost crude, the refinery output it would have produced and the missed export cargo may all be the same barrels. But the direction is clear. Saudi Arabia was the Gulf’s main source of relief. If its bypass is unreliable, the global deficit grows.
6. America cannot fill the hole: Miller’s test of American capacity is sobering. Over the four weeks to October 2, US refineries produced about 5.17 million barrels a day of distillate, exported 1.56 million and used 3.77 million at home. Replacing a 3 million barrel-a-day gap from the United States alone would require 58% more distillate output than American refineries produce today. US production is only about 150,000 barrels a day higher than a year ago; the global gap is nearly 20 times that. Promising more exports does not create more fuel. It simply moves the shortage from one buyer to another and drains American inventories.
7. Food, freight and flights: The fuel crisis is already reaching the real economy. Cereal prices are 17.2% higher than a year ago. Farmers need diesel before the harvest pays, truckers before their invoices are settled, and refrigeration before food reaches the shelf. Airlines need certified jet fuel at the airports they serve, and diesel cannot substitute for it. Miller’s warning is that the weakest buyers, countries short of foreign exchange and credit, will not just pay more. They will be priced out entirely.
My take: Miller’s assessment confirms what I have been arguing for months: the energy damage from this war is not a temporary price spike that ends when a ceasefire is signed. Reopening a shipping lane does not rebuild a refinery. Saudi Arabia, which only months ago was the world’s insurance policy, is now itself a source of risk, and its economy shows it: Saudi oil activity fell by a quarter in the second quarter and GDP shrank 4.8%. The rebuilding of the Gulf will be measured in years and trillions of dollars, and the world will be short of diesel for much of that time.
That should be the frame for every promise coming out of Washington, whether it is Russian diesel, export bans or claims that prices are about to fall. As Miller concludes, recovery will be proven by fuel actually delivered, not by repairs announced or by a lower headline price."
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"MBS Went Back to War With Yemen.
Now He’s Paying for It Alone"
"Saudi Arabia restarted its war with Yemen - and the Houthis answered at its oil heart, from Abqaiq to the pipeline to Yanbu. Now the money that bought its allies is running out, and Pakistan and Turkey won’t fight. Military and intelligence analyst Larry Johnson joins host Zulfiqar Ali to trace the chain, link by link: the strike that lit the fuse, the damage, the money, the allies, the isolation of Mohammed bin Salman - and the one power that wins.
What you’ll learn: how the 13 July strike on Sanaa airport restarted a war frozen since 2022 · why the East–West pipeline matters more than ever · why Saudi money no longer buys Pakistani or Turkish firepower · what leverage Riyadh still has over Washington · what a negotiated end would look like. Sourcing note: The pumping-station count and the Aramco repair timelines are Larry Johnson’s figures and have not been independently confirmed. Pakistani positions are our host’s own reporting; Pakistan’s Ministry of Information called the New York Times report of PAF strikes “fake and fabricated” on 8 October. On 7 October a Turkish official said Turkey would send mainly defensive and technical support. Public reporting describes the 13 July strike as hitting the Sanaa airport runway; the delegation’s plane diverted to Hodeidah."
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